A significant and strategic decision has been taken by the Government of India to deploy intelligence officers to North Korea under diplomatic cover. India is actively working to revive its diplomatic mission in North Korea, which was suspended in 2021 during the pandemic. This revival is set to materialize by January 2024, following a critical decision finalized just days ago in December 2023. The question naturally arises – why does India need to engage with North Korea, and why is this engagement of strategic importance? This piece will explore the necessity of India’s outreach to North Korea and the broader implications for regional security.

To understand this engagement, one must revisit the historical backdrop of Korea. In 1910, Japan occupied the entire Korean Peninsula, exploiting the resources of both northern and southern Korea to fuel its industrial revolution. After World War II, peace returned to the region, but not without division. The Korean Peninsula was split along the 38th parallel, creating two separate nations – North Korea aligned with the Soviet Union, and South Korea with the United States. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea remained under the protective umbrella of the USSR, serving as a testing ground for Soviet military experiments and weaponry.

The dynamic shifted dramatically in the 1970s, especially post-1971 when Pakistan lost East Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. In a bid to expand its alliances, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited North Korea in 1971, marking the beginning of deeper Pakistan-North Korea relations. This raised alarms in New Delhi, prompting the Indian government to deliberate the strategic necessity of engaging North Korea.

By 1972, under the leadership of RAW’s founding chief, Rameshwar Nath Kao, a proposal was put forth to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Kao’s argument was rooted in historical ties, citing evidence that in 48 AD, an Indian princess from Ayodhya, Suriratna, had married Kim Suro, the king of Korea. This historical connection became the foundation for India’s diplomatic overture, leading to the establishment of a mission in North Korea in 1973.

However, the primary driver behind this engagement was strategic. Pakistan’s barter trade agreements with North Korea were closely monitored by RAW, revealing Pakistan’s covert military interests. By the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea faced existential security threats and began pursuing nuclear weapons as a deterrent. India, recognizing the potential for Pakistan to exploit North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, intensified its intelligence presence in Pyongyang under the guise of diplomatic missions.

This covert operation paid dividends. RAW operatives identified frequent visits by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, to North Korea in the mid-1990s. Intelligence gathered by RAW indicated that Khan was facilitating missile technology transfers between Pakistan and North Korea, leading to the development of the Nodong missile, which Pakistan later rebranded as the Ghauri missile.

The strategic importance of this intelligence was immense. RAW successfully documented the transfer of missile components from North Korea to Pakistan via C-130 aircraft, exposing the involvement of American-supplied military hardware in facilitating nuclear proliferation. India leveraged this intelligence to confront the United States, highlighting the complicity and negligence that enabled Pakistan’s nuclear advancements.

Between 1994 and 1996, Abdul Qadeer Khan frequently visited North Korea, establishing small factories and research centers in collaboration with North Korean entities. This led to the development of the Nodong missile. RAW agents observed that Khan’s visits increased after Benazir Bhutto’s state visit to Pyongyang in 1993, during which agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation were signed, masking military collaborations.

By 1998, Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile, which was essentially a Nodong missile transferred from North Korea. RAW provided evidence to the Indian Prime Minister that the missile had been transported on American C-130 aircraft, exposing US oversight failures. This intelligence forced India to pressure the US diplomatically, highlighting that their military aid to Pakistan facilitated nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

In 2000, as diplomatic relations between India and the US thawed, the evidence provided by RAW became instrumental in reshaping bilateral ties. By 2003, international pressure led to the partial containment of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network, but the infrastructure for missile collaboration between Pakistan and North Korea persisted.

Between 2012 and 2016, RAW operatives continued monitoring North Korea, uncovering that Pakistani missile development was being aided by German scientists hired by Khan’s network. These scientists, working under the cover of Chinese companies, facilitated missile development in North Korea before transferring components to Pakistan. A critical intelligence report in 2016 identified the involvement of Chinese firms like Leibold AG and North Korea’s Changwang Sinyong Corporation in this covert missile collaboration.

In 2018, RAW presented further evidence to the Indian Prime Minister, warning that Pakistan was advancing towards intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities. This intelligence was corroborated when Pakistan announced the successful development of the Shaheen-3 missile in 2020, capable of striking targets within a 2,750 km radius.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 led to the temporary closure of India’s mission in North Korea, with diplomatic staff redeployed to Mongolia. However, intelligence gathering continued, and by 2023, RAW alerted the CIA that Pakistan’s ICBM program, backed by Chinese corporations, posed a direct threat to Israel and the United States.

In response, the US recently sanctioned four Chinese companies involved in missile development – Hubei Huachang Intelligent Equipment, Universal Enterprise, Xianlong Development, and Beijing Research Institute of Automation. This action prompted India to revive its diplomatic mission in North Korea, with plans to deploy intelligence officers by January 2024 to establish a listening post.

By reviving its diplomatic presence in North Korea, India not only aims to monitor these developments closely but also seeks to counterbalance growing security threats in the region. This strategic engagement underscores India’s commitment to regional stability and nuclear non-proliferation.

Written with input from Pavneet Singh